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This memorandum discusses the regulation of, and enforcement regarding, the internet pharmacy industry.
It concludes that the problem does not require additional regulation; existing laws are sucient to protect
against the current problems. The federal government is, however, in a position to aid state law enforcement
eorts. This memorandum proposes two ways in which Congress can bolster states' attempts to enforce
their laws. First, allowing states to gain injunctions in federal court, through a much narrower version of
the Telemarketing Sales Rule, would make state enforcement eorts stronger and more ecient without
burdening the federal courts. Second, encouraging states to form an interstate compact that better aligned
incentives and enforcement capacities would give states more power without requiring federal resources.
I.
The Problem: Diculties peculiar to the internet pharmacy industry make it dicult to enforce any regulatory scheme.
1A.
The eld is already suciently regulated.
Internet pharmacies are already subject to the thorough regulatory structure that governs brick-and-mortar
pharmarcies. The most important regulations are the federal and state laws requiring that prescription drugs
be issued only with a valid prescription.1 State statutes go further, requiring that doctors perform \good
faith" examinations before they issue prescriptions.2 Case law requires that the prescription be issued \in
the course of... professional practice"3 and within a valid doctor-patient relationship.4 This duty rests both
on the pharmacist and the prescribing physician.5 Many states also require that out-of-state pharmacies
obtain \nonresident" licenses before shipping prescription drugs into their state.6
The industry is also heavily self-regulated. The National Association of Boards of Pharmacy (\NABP")
allows internet pharmacy sites that meet and demonstrate compliance with state requirements to advertise
themselves as \Veried Internet Pharmacy Practice Sites" (\VIPPS").7 The NABP claims that this practice
1See 21 U.S.C. 353(b)(1)(c). See also, e.g., Cal. Business and Professions Code x 4059(a) (West 2000) (\No person shall
furnish any dangerous drug, except upon the prescription of a physician...."); New York Educ. Law x 6810(1) (McKinney
1999) (\No drug for which a prescription is required by [the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act]... shall be distributed or dispensed
to any person except upon a prescription....").
2Cal. Business and Professions Code x 2242 (West 1990). See also Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4542(a)(1)
x 26(15) (West 1998) (making it illegal to \dispense[] prescription drugs while acting outside the usual course and scope of
professional practice").
3Jin Fuey Moy v. United States, 254 U.S. 189, 194 (1920).
4See, e.g., Brown v. United States, 250 F.2d 745, 747 (5th Cir. 1958).
5See United States v. Guerrero, 650 F.2d 728, 730 n.1 (5th Cir. 1981).
6See, e.g., Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4542(a)(1) x 37(b) (West 1998) (\[I]t is unlawful for a pharmacy located
in a state... other than this state to ship, mail, or deliver to this state a prescription drug... dispensed under a prescription
drug order to a resident of this state unless the pharmacy is licensed with the board."); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. x 4729.551
(Anderson 1997) (\Each person, whether located within or outside this state, who sells dangerous drugs at retail for delivery
or distribution to persons residing in this state, shall be licensed as a terminal distributor of dangerous drugs...."); Fla.
Stat. Ann. x 465.0156(1) (1999) (\Any pharmacy which is located outside this state and which ships, mails, or delivers, in
any manner, a dispensed medicinal drug into this state shall be registered with the board...."). The National Association of
Boards of Pharmacy estimates that 40 U.S. jurisdictions require the licensing of out-of-state pharmacies. See Drugstores on
the Net: The Benets and Risks of On-line Pharmacies: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigation of the
House Comm. on Commerce, 106th Cong. (1999) (hereinafter \On-line Pharmacy Hearings) (statement of Carmen Catizone,
Executive Director, National Association of Boards of Pharmacy), available in 1999 WL 20010891.
7See On-line Pharmacy Hearings, supra note 6 (statement of Carmen Catizone, Executive Director, National Association
of Boards of Pharmacy), available in 1999 WL 20010891.
2\will inform consumers that the online site is a legitimate practice site licensed or registered with a state
agency."8 Likewise, the American Medical Association (\AMA") is drafting guidelines for doctors issuing
online prescriptions.9
B.
The problem is not that internet pharmacies are nding loopholes
in existing regulatory schemes, but that they are violating the laws
outright.
Oending internet pharmacies are violating existing laws directly and in a variety of ways. A University of
Pennsylvania study found that some foreign internet pharmacies are shipping drugs into the U.S. that FDA
has not approved.10 Other internet pharmacies issue prescription drugs without a valid prescription. It is
common, for example, for a doctor to prescribe a drug to a patient he or she has never met, simply based
on the patient's responses to an online questionnaire.11 Such a practice raises two primary dangers. First,
there is a potential conict of interest; the physician choosing whether to prescribe the drug is aliated with
the pharmacy that stands to prot from the prescription.12 Second, an online, check-the-appropriate-box
examination makes it very easy for patients to falsify information in order to obtain the prescription they
desire.13 The online questionnaires often facilitate this false information by preselecting the \appropriate"
8Id.
9See On-line Pharmacy Hearings, supra note 6 (statement of Dr. Herman Abromowitz, American Medical Association),
available in 1999 WL 20010892.
10See Bernard S. Bloom & Ronald C. Iannacone, Internet Availability of Prescription Pharmaceuticals to the Public, Annals
Internal Med., Sept. 27, 1999 <http://www.acponline.org/journals/annals/05oct99/bloom.htm>.
11See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, In Internet Drug Deals, a Regulations Dilemma, N.Y. Times, June 27, 1999, at .
12See Bloom & Iannacone, supra note 10.
13See id.
3responses for a given prescription.14
The oensive practices are already illegal. According to the AMA's Dr. Herman Abromowitz, \[e]very state
medical board" agrees that prescribing drugs without examining a patient or reviewing the patient's records
constitutes \practicing medicine at a level far below the acceptable standard of medical care."15 The nature
of the problem, then, means that additional regulations are unnecessary. The problem is one of enforcement.
C.
States have diculty enforcing their laws.
States have had some successes. Several have brought suits against internet pharmacies;16 Kansas brought a
suit against seven drug companies, six doctors, and three pharmacies,17 and Missouri obtained a temporary
restraining order against a pharmacy licensed in Texas.18 States have begun to cooperate in their eorts,
too, as the NABP has created a databank through which states inform other states of disciplinary actions
they bring against pharmacists or pharmacies.19
In these actions, however, states frequently have trouble nding the oending pharmacy. Although pharma-
cies that ship drugs into a state can be considered to \practice medicine" there,20 it is often dicult to track
14See id.
15On-line Pharmacy Hearings, supra note 6 (statement of Dr. Herman Abromowitz, American Medical Association), avail-
able in 1999 WL 20010892; see also On-line Pharmacy Hearings, supra note 6 (statement of Carmen Catizone, Executive
Director, NABP), available in 1999 WL 20010891 (stating that sites operating illegally often \inappropriately den[e] the use
of questionnaires or cyberspace consultations as constituting a valid patient-prescriber relationship").
16See Robert Pear, Controls Sought on Drug Sales on the Internet, N.Y. Times, Dec. 28, 1999, at .
17See State of Kansas Oce of the Attorney General, Attorney General Files Lawsuits to Prohibit Internet Drug Sales (June
9, 1999) <http://www.ink.org/public/ksag/contents/news-releases/news99/internetdrugsales.htm>.
18See On-line Pharmacy Hearings, supra note 6 (statement of Carmen Catizone, Executive Director, NABP), available in
1999 WL 20010891.
19See id.
20See On-line Pharmacy Hearings, supra note 6 (statement of Carla Stovall), available in 1999 WL 20010887.
4them down. According to the University of Pennsylvania study, only 10% of internet pharmacies reviewed
\would reveal their geographic location (city and country) beyond any information oered on the Internet.
No Web site would reveal the specic address of consulting physicians."21 This makes state enforcement
eorts dicult. Kansas Attorney General Carla Stovall called nding the oenders \[o]ne of the most di-
cult challenges" in internet pharmacy prosecutions.22 State ocials \have had to sort through multiple shell
corporations, addresses that turned out to be mail drops, overlapping addresses shared by dierent entities,
and similar evasive tactics."23 The eeting nature of internet businesses means that an oending site can
easily disappear, reappearing the next day in a new \location."24
Even when states can successfully enforce their laws, much of their action is inecient. In one instance,
for example, Kansas, Louisiana, and Washington were all actively pursuing a single doctor aliated with
an internet pharmacy. All three states claimed that he had prescribed drugs to patients whom he had not
examined.25 This sort of duplicative eort indicates a realm in which the federal government might be of
assistance.
The problem is not one of regulation, but of enforcement: How can the federal government best facilitate
states' attempts to enforce their laws?
II.
A limited version of the Telemarketing Sales Rule,26 allowing state attorneys general to seek injunctions in federal courts, would solve many of the enforcement problems without adding any signicant burdens on the federal government.
21Bloom & Iannacone, supra note 10.
22On-line Pharmacy Hearings, supra note 6 (statement of Carla Stovall), available in 1999 WL 20010887.
23Id.
24See Robert V. Wiesemann, Note, On-Line or On-Call? Legal and Ethical Challenges Emerging in Cybermedicine, 43 St.
Louis U. L.J. 1119, 1153 (1999); On-line Pharmacy Hearings, supra note 6 (statement of Rep. Fred Upton).
25See Stolberg, supra note 11.
5A.
Allowing state attorneys general access to federal courts is appro-
priate in the internet pharmacy context for the same reasons that
it was appropriate in the telemarketing fraud context.
State access to federal courts was appropriate in the telemarketing context, because telemarketing fraud is
an oense for which the mobility and anonymity of the oender, and the large, multi-state scale on which the
oense can take place, render state jurisdictional limits inadequate. Just like illegitimate internet pharma-
cies, those who commit telephone fraud are dicult to nd and, when they are found, can relocate quickly
and easily. As the House Energy and Commerce Committee found in recommending the telemarketing legis-
lation, telemarketing { though very cost-eective27 - \can be carried on without any direct contact between
sellers who may be based in one State and customers who may be based in another State."28 Further,
\[b]ecause telemarketers are not very dependent upon a xed location as a point of sale, they can be very
mobile, easily moving from State to State."29 This anonymity and mobility are equally present in internet
pharmacies.
Yet even when state ocials could track down oending telemarketers, state jurisdictional limits made en-
forcement dicult. Noted the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, \Even if court
orders are obtained by a State against a fraudulent telemarketer in that State, the fraudulent telemarketer
can continue to do business, and harm consumers, in other States."30 A data bank through which state and
27House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, Consumer Protection Telemarketing Act, H.R. Rep. No. 103-20, at 2
(1993) [hereinafter House Telemarketing Report].
28Id. See also Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Telemarketing and Consumer Fraud
and Abuse Prevention Act, S. Rep. No. 103-80, at 3 (1993) [hereinafter Senate Telemarketing Report] (\Telemarketing
diers from other sales activities in that it can be carried out by sellers across State lines without any meeting between buyer
and seller.").
29House Telemarketing Report, supra note 27, at 2; see also Senate Telemarketing Report, supra note 28, at 2
(\[T]elemarketers can by denition be very mobile, easily moving from State to State.").
30Senate Telemarketing Report, supra note 28, at 3; see also House Telemarketing Report, supra note 27, at 4
(quoting testimony that state \jurisdictional limits make it dicult to prosecute or obtain relief from fraudulent telemarketers
6federal ocials could share information on violators { much like the one the NABP currently maintains for
internet pharmacies31 { proved ineective.32
The Telemarketing Sales Rule (\TSR") proved a good response to that type of situation. By giving federal
eect to state enforcement eorts, and allowing one state to obtain a nationwide injunction, a TSR-like
rule can end duplicative state eorts. It also allows courts to issue injunctions that are well-tailored for
their particular circumstances. In New York v. Financial Service Network, for example, the TSR allowed
the court to give very specic instructions regarding future telephone promotions and the preservation of
evidence.33 At the same time, however, the rule also allows the federal government to ensure consistency
in enforcement. The federal government reserved the right to intervene, be heard, and le appeals on any
state-brought action.34
who locate their operations outside the states in which their victims are located or move frequently to avoid detection and
prosecution under state law").
31See On-line Pharmacy Hearings, supra note 6 (statement of Carmen Catizone, Executive Director, National Association
of Boards of Pharmacy), available in 1999 WL 20010891.
32See House Telemarketing Report, supra note 27, at 4.
33See New York v. Financial Services Network, 930 F.Supp. 865, 872 { 73 (W.D.N.Y. 1996).
34See 15 U.S.C. x 6103.
7B.
The version of the rule submitted here will not increase the number
of lawsuits.
Allowing states to le in federal court has not appeared to have increased litigation,35 and may actually
decrease it. Since the TSR became eective in 1995, it has resulted in only two published opinions.36 And
in the internet pharmacy context, it could cause even fewer lawsuits. First, it would create no new cause of
action. States can already bring these actions in state courts. The rule would only oer an another, more
eective forum for suits that states would have brought regardless. And even if relocating the suits to federal
court might increase costs, \such costs are not likely to be signicant."37 Second, and most importantly,
the possibility of one state obtaining a nationwide injunction, when appropriate, means that no longer will
multiple states need to pursue the same oender. In New York v. Financial Services Network, for example,
North Carolina joined New York's prosecution.38 Because they could achieve a nationwide injunction, how-
ever, they needed to le just one suit, not two.
Whatever the eects of the TSR, the version presented here is so much narrower that it will have even less
of an eect on litigation. First, it sets a higher bar to the courtroom than does the TSR. The TSR opens the
courtroom doors to any attorney general who \has reason to believe" that state residents' \interests... have
been or are being threatened" by illegal telemarketing practices.39 This is a very low standard; Tennessee,
35The Administrative Oce of the United States Courts does not keep records of the number of lawsuits that states led
under the TSR. Telephone Interview with Gwendolyn Coleman, Statistics Division, Administrative Oce of the United States
Courts (Jan. 24, 2000).
36The cases are New York v. Financial Services Network, 930 F.Supp. 865 (W.D.N.Y. 1996), and Tennessee v. Lexington
Law Firms, No. 3:96-0344, 1997 WL 367409 (M.D. Tenn. May 14, 1997).
37House Telemarketing Report, supra note 27, at 6 (quoting Letter from Robert D. Reischauer, Director, Congressional
Budget Oce, to Hon. John Dingell, Chairman, House Committee on Energy and Commerce (Feb. 27, 1993) (describing the
nancial eects that allowing state access to federal courts would have on the judiciary)).
38See New York v. Financial Services Network, 930 F.Supp. 865, 865 (W.D.N.Y. 1996).
3915 U.S.C. x 6103.
8for example, was able to bring an action in federal court for a phone call placed between Illinois and Utah, on
the slight grounds that the call was part of a pattern that threatened Tennessee residents.40 The language
suggested here, however, is much more restrictive. An attorney general could gain access to federal court
only by alleging that the internet pharmacy has actually distributed illegal drugs into the state. States
may not gain a federal injunction against a pharmacy that merely \threatens the interests" of the residents,
nor may they use the federal powers against in-state pharmacies,41 a matter for which the state courts are
adequately empowered.
Second, this language oers a much narrower scope of relief. The TSR allowed states to seek damages in the
federal court system.42 The bill suggested here does not allow states to use federal courts for restitution.
Rather, it focuses on the injunction and halting the illegal practice. Once a state has won an injunction, it
must return to state courts, which can address damages and restitution just as eectively as federal courts.
If there are still concerns that granting states this enforcement tool would unnecessarily increase litigation,
additional language could be inserted requiring that a state wishing to use federal court rst have its suit
certied by FDA.43 This would give the federal government the power to place a cap on such access. How-
ever, the cost of administering such a certication program could be greater than the burdens of unfettered
access.44
40See Tennessee v. Lexington Law Firms, No. 3:96-0344, 1997 WL 367409, at *3 (M.D. Tenn. May 14, 1997).
41The language requires that the pharmacy have shipped or distributed the goods into the state from outside the state. Thus
an in-state pharmacy, which is unlikely to have shipped from outside the state, is subject only to state courts. The federal
courts are necessary only when state jurisdiction is inadequate.
42See 15 U.S.C. x 6103(a).
43To add this restriction, section 3(a) must be amended to begin with the language, \Subject to the requirements of subsection
(b) of this section," and the current subsection (b) must be replaced with, \(b) Certication. No State may proceed with a civil
action under subsection (a) of this section without rst having its suit certied by FDA. FDA shall certify only those actions
for which a parallel action in state court would be inadequate to enforce 21 U.S.C. x 353(b) properly.
44Such a requirement would certainly have administrative costs. Even if FDA were not required to issue full regulations
regarding when it would grant or refuse certication, cf. Professionals and Patients for Customized Care v. Shalala, 56 F.3d
592 (5th Cir. 1995) (allowing FDA to issue \policy statements," rather than substantive rules, provided that the agency leaves
itself genuine room for discretion and imposes no legal burden), requiring FDA certication does impose an administrative cost
with no obvious benet.
9C.
The approach suggested here will reduce pressure on the federal
government.
Enforcing the current regulations is a substantial cost for a cash-strapped agency. By shifting enforcement
power to the states, however, the federal government can preserve resources45 and give states, which do most
regulating and licensing of pharmaceutical practices anyway, discretion over how to enforce those policies.46
The plan also prevents a future need for further federal regulation. From many perspectives, the internet
pharmacy industry is ripe for federal intervention. On a \state failure" model, under which the federal
government should handle issues \when state prosecution is demonstrably inadequate,"47 federal assistance
is fast becoming appropriate. Similarly, the fact that the issue has substantial multi-state aspects means
that, according to the Committee on Long Range Planning of the Judicial Conference of the United States,
it deserves federal attention.48 These concerns can be rebutted, however, if states are given adequate tools
to handle the multi-state aspects on their own. The bill suggested here would do just that.
III.
An interstate compact, granting \recipient states" access to the law enforcement mechanisms of \host states," would help state enforcement eorts without tapping federal resources.
45Cf. Terrance DeWald & Amy Blumenthal, The Telemarketing and Consumer Fraud and Abusive Protection Act: Did
Congress Create a Private Right of Action for Violation of SRO Rules?, 1062 Practising Law Institute Corporate Law
and Practice Course Handbook Series 241, 243 (1998) (stating that, for the TSR, \Congress also recognized that the
problem was of such magnitude that the Commission's resources were inadequate to protect consumers from such widespread
abuse and authorized actions by state attorneys general as well as private actions by individuals").
46This state enforcement would be subject only to broad oversight by FDA to assure general consistency.
47Geraldine Szott Moohr, The Federal Interest in Criminal Law, 47 Syracuse L. Rev. 1127, 1142 (1997).
48See Committee on Long Range Planning of the Judicial Conference of the United States, Long Range Plan
for the Federal Courts 24 (1995).
10A.
Enforcement of internet pharmacy regulations is an appropriate
issue for an interstate compact.
Interstate compacts have long been viewed as a useful way to handle law enforcement problems,49 especially
when the problem clearly \transcends state lines."50 Congress can grant its consent to such compacts in
several dierent ways. It can consent to a specic compact that states have already negotiated.51 Or, it can
give states a blank check to enter into whatever compacts on a given topic they desire.52
A third approach may be more appropriate here. Under this approach, Congress encourages states to en-
ter into an agreement by granting advance consent.53 However, Congress still reserves the right to \veto"
any compact after it has been entered into.54 This conditional consent would be valuable here, because it
would give FDA and the states signicant encouragement to enter into an agreement, but it would still give
Congress sucient oversight of the regulation of electronic commerce.55
49See, e.g., Crime Control Consent Act of 1934, ch. 406, 48 Stat. 909 (codied as amended at 4 U.S.C. x 112(a) (1994))
(authorizing states to enter into compacts regarding crime control).
50Paul T. Hardy, Interstate Compacts: The Ties That Bind 2 (1982).
51See, e.g., Act of July 11, 1940, ch. 581, 54 Stat. 752 (codied as amended at 33 U.S.C. x 567a) (granting consent to an
interstate compact regarding pollution in the Ohio River drainage basin).
52The Crime Control Consent Act of 1934, supra note 49, was this kind of \blank check" consent.
53The National Association of Attorneys General has in the past asked Congress to speed up the consent process. See
Frederick Zimmerman & Mitchell Wendell, The Law and Use of Interstate Compacts 22 (1961) (citing National
Association of Attorneys General, Conference Proceedings 167 { 74 (1957)).
54See, e.g., 50 U.S.C. x 2281(g) (1994) (granting consent to any civil defense compact which Congress does not specically
reject within sixty days of the compact being led) (repealed 1994).
55Appropriate consent legislation is attached. See infra, Appendix B.
11B.
The compact proposed here56 would allow a state attorney general
to seek an injunction, against an internet pharmacy that has vio-
lated the laws of the attorney general's state, in the courts of the
internet pharmacy's home state.
Under the proposed compact, party states would grant each other this power in carefully dened circum-
stances. If an attorney general of a state (\the recipient state") believed that an internet pharmacy57 located
in another state (\the host state") was improperly shipping or prescribing drugs to a patient located in the
recipient state, the attorney general could seek an injunction against the oending practice in the host state's
courts. Then, if the host state's courts agreed that the pharmacy was violating both recipient state laws and
good medical practice, the court would issue an appropriate injunction. The host state would then ensure
that the oender complied with the injunction's terms.58
This compact would thus assist state enforcement eorts by placing enforcement responsibility on the state in
the best position to enforce the regulations. It acknowledges a fundamental dilemma of interstate commercial
law enforcement: the recipient state has the best incentive to bring the action, because its laws are being
violated, but the host state is in the best position to enforce the regulations. For example, if a recipient state
56A draft of such a compact is attached. See infra, Appendix C.
57This would also apply to a pharmacist or doctor aliated with such a pharmacy.
58Thus there are several things that this compact would not do. First, it would not require any sort of disclosure or information
exchange among party states. There are two possible versions of such a disclosure requirement. One version would require party
states to disclose pharmacies that are licensed in their state, thus letting other states know that if pharmacy P ships out of state
S, S has found P to be a pharmacy in good standing. However, this accomplishes very little. Recipient states do not care whether
P is licensed in S. Recipient states, for the most part, require that P be licensed in their own state. See supra note 6. Another
version of the disclosure requirement would ask states to disclose pharmacies that have violated their laws, thus identifying
possible oenders for other states to investigate. A compact of this sort would do very little; the NABP currently maintains a
National Disciplinary Clearinghouse and Database that does roughly the same thing. See On-line Pharmacy Hearings, supra
note 6 (statement of Carmen Catizone, Executive Director, National Association of Boards of Pharmacy), available in 1999
WL 20010891.
Second, this compact would not create a reciprocity agreement, through which states would recognize as valid licenses issued
in other states. States are free to do this already. Moreover, licensing is but a small part of the problem. Reciprocity would do
nothing to assist states trying to enforce their laws against oenders.
12wished to ensure that an out-of-state pharmacy were complying with the recipient state's court orders, its
options would be extremely costly. It could monitor all packages coming into the state, hoping to intercept
anything from the oending pharmacy. Or it could assign a law enforcement ocer to monitor the activities
of the out-of-state pharmacy and its aliated pharmacists and doctors. Both options would be useless if
done poorly and outrageously expensive if done thoroughly. Under the compact, however, the host state {
not the recipient state { would be responsible for enforcing the order.
Thus the real gain of this compact would come not in the reciprocal access to other states' courts, but in the
gains in enforcement eciency. These gains would come from having the monitoring of resident pharmacies
and doctors in the hands of their host states. Host states are in a much better position to monitor such
pharmacies. They can easily inspect packages leaving the building, and they can perform random spot checks
of prescription and dispensing practices. State attorneys general would no longer hesitate to bring an action
against out-of-state internet pharmacies out of fear that, even were the action successful, it would be too
dicult to enforce.
13C.
Although states might be hesitant to ask their courts to enforce
the laws of other states, the compact includes several safeguards to
protect internet pharmacies and the integrity of their home states'
judiciaries.
Although this compact would burden the courts of states that are home to internet pharmacies, granting
court access to recipient states' attorneys general would give host state courts more power, not less. As
laws currently stand, recipient states would bring these actions in their own courts. This compact, however,
would give attorneys general the option to trade control for enforcement: an attorney general seeking the
stronger enforcement capacities of the host state must cede control to the host states' courts.
Moreover, state courts would in no way be \hostage" to the idiosyncracies of other states' laws. This is so
for two reasons. First, state laws in this area are substantially similar. State boards of pharmacy require
valid patient-prescriber relationship,59 and state medical boards require a doctor to examine a patient or
review the patient's records before issuing a prescription.60 These basic requirements do not vary across
state lines. Second, in order to gain an injunction in a host state court, a recipient state attorney general
would have to show that the doctor had violated good medical practice.61 This sets a double barrier, so that
a host state court does not become involved merely because a pharmacy violated a technicality of another
jurisdiction. Rather, for a host state court to become involved, the pharmacy must also violate good medical
or pharmaceutical practice { a serious violation indeed.
Thus the compact also protects the internet pharmacies themselves. First, giving host state courts jurisdic-
59See On-line Pharmacy Hearings, supra note 6 (statement of Carmen Catizone, Executive Director, National Association
of Boards of Pharmacy), available in 1999 WL 20010891.
60See On-line Pharmacy Hearings, supra note 6 (statement of Dr. Herman Abromowitz, American Medical Association),
available in 1999 WL 20010892.
61Correspondingly, the attorney general would have to show that the pharmacy or pharmacist had violated good pharma-
ceutical practice.
14tion means that, although violators would be subject to closer monitoring, actions would be more likely to
be brought in the courts of the pharmacy's own state. This is attractive both politically, as the pharmacies
can appear in a more friendly home-state court, and nancially, as it will not have to travel to face action in
an inconvenient location. Second, the \good medical or pharmaceutical practice" requirement creates a safe
haven of sorts. For internet pharmacies that observe good practice standards, nothing would change. They
would still be liable in recipient state courts. Internet pharmacies that violate these standards, however,
would now be subject to the strict monitoring of home state law enforcement.
IV.
Conclusion
The two approaches have their advantages and disadvantages. The interstate compact, state court approach
will make no alterations to the federal structure. Except for technical consent legislation, it consumes no
national resources. However, interstate compacts take a long time to negotiate62 and even longer to take
eect.63 The federal court approach, in contrast, can take eect immediately and gives state law enforcement
ocials a much stronger tool. However, it will relocate a small handful of cases to federal court.
Regardless, either approach is better than the status quo or some of the alternatives currently being discussed.
The problem is one of enforcement, not regulation. A proper solution will assist state enforcement eorts
without burdening a growing and important industry with an additional layer of regulation. Either solution
oered here will do just that.
62See Vincent V. Thursby, Interstate Cooperation: A Study of the Interstate Compact 138 (1953).
63The National Council of State Boards of Nursing, for example, recently concluded a multistate Nurse Licensure Com-
pact. Since its promulgation in November of 1998, only six states have enacted it. Only ve more have taken any leg-
islative action at all. See National Council of State Boards of Nursing, State Compact Bill Status (visited Jan. 29, 2000)
<http://www.ncsbn.org/les/mutual/billstatus.asp>.
15State Access to Federal Courts
Section 1. Title
This act shall be known as the Internet Pharmacy Enforcement State Empowerment Act.
Section 2. Denitions
For purposes of this act:
(a)
The term \internet" means collectively the myriad of computer and telecommunications world-wide network of networks that employ the Transmission Control Protocol / Internet Protocol, or any predecessor or successor protocols to such protocol, to communicate information of all kinds by wire or radio.
(b)
(1) The terms \site" and \address", with respect to the internet, mean a specic location on the internet that is determined by Internet Protocol Numbers. Such terms include the domain name, if any.
(2) The term \domain name" means a method of representing an internet
address without direct reference to the Internet Protocol Numbers for the address,
including methods that use the designations \.com", \.edu", \.gov", and \.org".
(3)
The term \internet protocol numbers" includes any successor protocol for determining a specic location on the internet.
(c)
The term \drug" means an article subject to 21 U.S.C. x 321(g).
(d)
The term \prescription drug" means a drug subject to 21 U.S.C. x 353(b).
(e)
The term \internet pharmacy" means an internet site through which users can submit purchase orders for drugs or prescription drug, or conduct any other part of a sales transaction for a drug or prescription drug.
Section 3. State Access to Federal Courts
16(a)
In general
Whenever an attorney general of any State has reason to believe that an internet pharmacy has shipped or distributed drugs from outside of that State into that State, in violation of 21 U.S.C. x 353(b), the State, as parens patriae, may bring a civil action on behalf of its residents in an appropriate district court of the United States to enjoin such internet pharmacy from shipping or distributing misbranded drugs, to enforce compliance with such rule of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), or to obtain further and other relief, not including damages, restitution, or other compensation, as the court may deem appropriate.
(b)
Notice
The State shall serve prior written notice of any civil action under subsection (a) or (f)(2) of this section upon the FDA and provide FDA with a copy of its complaint, except that if it is not feasible for the State to provide such prior notice, the State shall serve such notice immediately upon instituting such action. Upon receiving a notice respecting a civil action, FDA shall have the right (1) to intervene in such action, (2) upon so intervening, to be heard on all matters arising therein, and (3) to le petitions for appeal.
(c)
Construction
For purposes of bringing any civil action under subsection (a) of this section, nothing in this section shall prevent an attorney general from exercising the powers conferred on the attorney general by the laws of such State to conduct investigations or to administer oaths or armations or to compel the attendance of witnesses or the production of documentary and other evidence.
(d)
Actions by FDA
Whenever a civil action has been instituted by or on behalf of FDA for violation of any rule prescribed under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 301 et seq.), no State may, during the pendency of such action instituted by or on behalf of FDA, institute a civil action under subsection (a) or (f)(2) of this section against any defendant named in the complaint in such action for violation of any rule as alleged in such complaint.
(e)
Venue; service of process
Any civil action brought under subsection (a) of this section in a district court of the United States may be brought in the district in which the defendant is found, is an inhabitant, or transacts business or wherever venue is proper under section 1391 of title 28. Process in such an action may be served in any district in which the defendant is an inhabitant or in which the defendant may be found.
(f)
Actions by other State ocials
(1) Nothing contained in this section shall prohibit an authorized State ocial from proceeding in State court on the basis of an alleged violation of any civil or criminal statute of such State, including the seeking of damages, or restitution, or other compensation in a matter pursuant to which the State had sought and/or gained an injunction under subsections (a) or (f)(2) of this section.
(2) In addition to actions brought by an attorney general of a State under subsection
(a) of this section, such an action may be brought by ocers of such State who are
authorized by the State to bring actions in such State on behalf of its residents.
Interstate Compact Enabling Legislation
Section 1. Title
This act shall be known as the Internet Pharmacy|Court Access Interstate Compact Authorization
Act.
17Section 2. Authorization
The Commissioner of the Food and Drug Administration is hereby authorized to assist and encourage
States to negotiate and enter into an interstate compact regarding the enforcement of state and federal
regulations of internet pharmacies; review the terms and conditions of such a proposed compact in order to
assist to the extent feasible in obtaining consistency with federal enforcement eorts; assist and coordinate
the activities thereunder; provided, that a copy of such internet pharmacy compact shall be transmitted
promptly to the Senate and the House of Representatives. The consent of Congress shall be granted to
each such compact, upon the expiration of the rst period of sixty calendar days of continuous session of
the Congress following the date on which the compact is transmitted to it; but only if, between the date
of transmittal and expiration of such sixty-day period, there has not been passed a concurrent resolution
stating in substance that the Congress does not approve the compact; provided, that nothing in this sec-
tion shall be construed as preventing Congress from withdrawing at any time its consent to any such compact.
Internet Pharmacy-Court Access Interstate Compact
Article I. Findings and Purpose
18A.
The party states nd that
1.
Proper licensing of medical and pharmaceutical practioners is essential for en-
suring eective regulatory system.
2. The issuing of prescription drugs without a proper prescription is a serious
threat to public health and safety.
3.
Pharmacies operating primarily from the internet are dicult to nd, regulate,
and monitor across state lines.
B.
The general purposes of this Compact are to
1.
Assist states in their attempts to enforce their regulations of out-of-state, in-
ternet pharmacies.
2. Build a system of cooperation, through which enforcement of regulations
governing internet pharmacies can occur at its most eective and ecient level,
the host state.
3. Ensure that states into which internet pharmacies illegally ship drugs have
access to the enforcement mechanisms of host states.
4. Protect host state judiciaries from having to enforce idiosyncratically strin-
gent regulations of recipient states.
Article II. Denitions




\Internet" means collectively the myriad of computer and telecommunications
world-wide network of networks that employ the Transmission Control Protocol
/ Internet Protocol, or any predecessor or successor protocols to such protocol,
to communicate information of all kinds by wire or radio.
2. \Site" and \address," with respect to the internet, mean a specic location
on the internet that is determined by Internet Protocol Numbers. Such terms
include the domain name, if any.
3. \Domain name" means a method of representing an internet address without
direct reference to the Internet Protocol Numbers for the address, including
methods that use the designations \.com", \.edu", \.gov", and \.org".
4.
\Internet Protocol Numbers" includes any successor protocol for determining




\Drug" means an article subject to 21 U.S.C. x 321(g).
2. \Prescription drug" means a drug subject to 21 U.S.C. x 353(b).
3. \Internet Pharmacy" means an internet site through which users can submit
purchase orders for drugs or prescription drug, or conduct any other part of a
sales transaction for a drug or prescription drug.
4. \Good Medical Practice" means the standards that are generally accepted
by the medical community as constituting appropriate and adequate care.
5.
\Good Pharmaceutical Practice" means the standards that are generally ac-





\Host state" means the party state in which the internet pharmacy is located.
2. \Party state" means any state that has adopted this Compact.
3. \Recipient state" means the party state into which an internet pharmacy
ships or distributes drugs.




If an attorney general of a party state (\the recipient state") believes that a
doctor located in another party state (\the host state") and aliated with an
internet pharmacy has prescribed drugs for a patient located in the recipient
state in violation of good medical or pharmaceutical practice and the laws of the
recipient state, the attorney general of the recipient state shall have standing
to seek an injunction or other order in the host state's courts prohibiting the
violative practice.
2. If a court of the host state nds that the doctor has prescribed drugs for
a patient located in the recipient state in violation of good medical or phar-
maceutical practice and the laws of the recipient state, the court shall issue an
appropriate injunction or other order prohibiting the doctor from continuing the
violative practice.
3. If a court of the host state nds that an internet pharmacy employing a
doctor engaged in violative practices as described in III(A)(1) of this Compact
is engaged in a practice of employing of doctors violating good medical or phar-
maceutical practice and the laws of recipient states, the court shall issue an
appropriate injunction or other order prohibiting the internet pharmacy from




If an attorney general of a party state (\the recipient state") believes that an
internet pharmacy located in another party state (\the host state") has dis-
tributed drugs into the recipient state in violation of good medical or pharma-
ceutical practice and the laws of the recipient state, the attorney general of the
recipient state shall have standing to seek an injunction or other order in the
host state's courts prohibiting the violative practice.
2. If a court of the host state nds that the internet pharmacy has distributed
drugs into the recipient state in violation of good medical or pharmaceutical
practice and the laws of the recipient state, the court shall issue an appropriate




Upon the issuance of an injunction or other order pursuant to Ar-
ticle III(A)(2), Article III(A)(3), or Article III(B)(2) of this Com-
pact, the host state shall take all reasonable steps to ensure that the
internet pharmacy or oending physician complies with the terms
of said injunction or other order.
Article IV. Date of Eectiveness and Withdrawal
A.
This Compact shall enter into force and become eective as to any
state when it has been enacted into the laws of that state.
B.
Any party state may withdraw from this Compact by enacting a
statute repealing the same.
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